Post Number Four: Benveniste's Crackpot Theories

1. Benveniste argues that language is not a man-made tool like a wheel or a pick, but is instead "the very definition of man." He discounts the idea that fully formed men discovered each other and slowly created language as a tool for themselves, and argues that because language is immaterial and has content, it doesn't make sense to compare it to a "thing." Instead, he argues, that "thing" that people are talking about when they compare language to an instrument is really speech, or discourse. 

I agree with this idea for the most part, but I think that it is a little stupid to say that language is completely not developed by humans. Compare the languages we speak today to those of hunter gatherer societies thousands of years ago, and you will find that ours are far more complex and useful to us. Also, I speak a language that includes slang and computer lingo that my parents don't understand because it was created after I was born.

2. Benveniste writes that the word "I" only has meaning when there is also a "you" who is being addressed. He says that there is a "polarity of persons" which creates the fundamental difference between "I" and "you," which makes language function. This, he argues, is the basis for the consciousness of self.

I think the counter argument to this, which I find equally compelling, is that people (babies) and animals without language DO have a sense of self, they just can't express it to anyone else because they don't have language--and if they did express it to someone else, Benveniste would argue that it was the expression that created the sense of self. So since it's impossible to prove correct or incorrect, I think this would have been better presented as a tentative explanation for where our sense of self comes from rather than an all-encompassing theory.

3. Benveniste argues that the notion of time is contained within the expression of language. He points out that linguistic time is self-referential, and is denoted with verb tenses and other structural signifiers.

I think this is a strong point to make, and it's interesting, too. While many argue that time is a human construct, which is an idea that's easy to resist and argue against, Benveniste is pointing out that the time that we think of and talk about in every day life is a linguistic construct composed of different words and turns of phrase. It takes the notion out of the existential realm that is so hard to argue in, and brings it down to a more sensible arena.

Post Number Three: Real Stuffed Animals

Lacan sees "the real" as everything outside of the symbolic and the imaginary. The subject then exists at the borders of language represented by symbols and by the landscape of the imagination, which is modeled after language.

In the doll story, the older sister convinces the younger sister that the Webkinz's soul exists on the internet, and that they need only to download a new soul to replace it. But by applying Lacan's theory of "the real," we can quickly see that the doll isn't real, that it doesn't have a soul. The doll exists in both the symbolic and the imaginary--the doll is a symbol of some other animal or person, and the childrens' imagination give the doll meaning--but it doesn't exist beyond, in "the real." According to Lacan, the doll doesn't have a soul any more than a word does.

Instead, the doll can be seen as a demand by the children--an attempt to fulfill their desire to return to the imaginary, which in their cases was lost only recently. The story about the death of the doll and the new personality code from the internet shows that the children have suspended their disbelief about the inanimate nature of the doll, but then dropping the doll out of a car window threatens that belief. The girls suddenly feel the tension between the imaginary and the symbolic--they know that the doll exists outside of themselves, they just proved it by dropping it out of a window. And when the younger girl begins to lament the death of the doll, as she would the death of a close relative or someone else she would perceive as being more similar to herself, the older girl brings her into the symbolic to console her. She points out that the doll is a representation of something else.

Post Number Two: Freud and Sexuality

Freud's theory of the development of sexuality applies only to boys--his theory for girls was derived from his theory for boys, and it doesn't make too much sense. But for boys, and I am a boy, he says that sexuality begins with a sense of oneness with the mother. The separation from the mother's body at birth does not register with the boy psychologically until much later, when he realizes that he has a penis. His fondness for his penis is met with threats of punishment for his female caregivers, and when he eventually sees female genitalia, he interprets the presence of the vagina as a lack of a penis--then he connects the dots and realizes that the the female caregivers are men that have already been castrated, and that they may also castrate him. He can then identify with his mother's passive sexual experience of his father, or he can actively identify with his father and imagine sex with his mother. Tada.

I think it's a good theory. It doesn't explain every situation, and it sort of stops making sense after the castration anxiety bit comes in, but it's a useful tool to use when interpreting the sexual behavior of men and their attitudes toward women. For example, the theory would interpret misogyny as fear that one is not manly enough--which I believe is accurate. It also explains the jealousy and aggression between fathers and sons, especially sons of particularly doting mothers.

As far as my own sexuality goes, I think Freud's theory applies to me better than it does to most. While I don't play sports, I do constantly do exhibitionistic things--both artistically and sexually--just to prove to myself that no one will castrate me.

Also, once when I was two, my mother was carrying me upstairs, and my dad said from the bottom, "Where are you guys going?" I replied, "Upstairs." He said, "Can I come?" And I made a little gun with my hand and said, "Bang!"

Post Number One, March 17

In your own words, how would you characterize the Enlightenment Period? What were the dominant theories of subjectivity or selfhood during this era?

The Enlightenment Period was a period in which the self emerged as a focus of philosophical discussion. The self of the Enlightenment Period was a free self that was formed at birth, and which tried to express itself despite society's attempts to constrain and define it. Philosophers such as Rousseau and Kant explored the subject. Rousseau wrote about the uniqueness of the concept of "I" and the value of exploring it, while Kant took a more distanced and theoretical approach, proposing that all interactions with the world must go through the filter of "I."

These ideas are at odds with more modern philosophical and psychoanalytical views of the self, which state that the self is constructed by society, as opposed to being a pure thing that is struggling against society. However, the view of the self as pure and pre-formed still persists today, especially in popular thought.